draft · last edited 2026-05-06 19:03

The DAO of Slack — Architecture

Working title: Dobbs-Aligned Order of Wisdom (DAOW) / Conspiracy of Slack / CoSG-DAO. Pick a final name in proposal #0.

This document describes the proposed governance system for SubGenius Networks: the entity that oversees SubGenius.Finance, the wBOB bridge, and chain-level signaling for Dobbscoin (BOB). Voting weight is denominated in wBOB on Gnosis Chain.

NOT FINANCIAL ADVISORS. NOT FINANCIAL ADVICE. This document is a working design, not a charter. Nothing here is binding until ratified by proposal.

1. Design principles

These are the load-bearing constraints. Every later choice is downstream of these.

1. wBOB stays a plain ERC-20. No governance hooks bolted onto the token. The bridge already pinky-swears 1:1 backing of wBOB by native (BOB); adding transfer hooks, snapshots, or vote-tracking to the token itself widens the attack surface against people just trying to trade. Voting reads from wBOB; it does not modify wBOB.
2. The DAO sits alongside the bridge, not inside it. Bridge keys remain held by their current operators. The DAO can advise, fund, and signal — it cannot seize bridge custody. (If we eventually want bridge upgradeability under DAO control, that’s a separate, later proposal with its own threat model.)
3. Optimize for low-friction participation on Gnosis Chain. Gas is cheap there but not free, and most (BOB) holders are not power-users. Default to gasless voting where it’s safe.
4. Dobbscoin-the-chain is sovereign. The chain has no on-chain governance hook for the DAO. DAO votes about the chain (e.g. “we recommend nodes upgrade to v0.10.4”) are signaling, not enforcement. Nodes opt in.
5. Custody is plural. Treasury is split across multiple Safes by purpose, not pooled in one. Compromise of one purse should not drain the rest.
6. Proposals are forkable. Charter, parameters, and Safe configs are all governed by proposal — including the rules for changing themselves.

2. Recommended architecture (Phase 1)

The path I recommend is the well-trodden one used by Balancer, Aave, ENS-precursors, Lido, Gitcoin, Olympus, Synthetix, Curve, Ben.eth’s pets, etc.: Snapshot for voting, Gnosis Safe for custody, Zodiac for on-chain execution.

   ┌─────────────────────┐
   │  wBOB holders       │  (ERC-20 on Gnosis, chainId 100)
   │  + LP positions     │
   └──────────┬──────────┘
              │ (1) read balance via Snapshot strategy
              ▼
   ┌─────────────────────┐
   │  Snapshot space     │  off-chain, gasless signed votes
   │  cosg-dao.eth       │  (configurable strategies, quorum, durations)
   └──────────┬──────────┘
              │ (2) result posted as proposal hash
              ▼
   ┌─────────────────────┐         ┌──────────────────────┐
   │  Zodiac Reality     │ ◄─────► │  UMA optimistic oracle│
   │  Module (oSnap)     │         │  / Reality.eth        │
   └──────────┬──────────┘         └──────────────────────┘
              │ (3) approved tx queued
              ▼
   ┌─────────────────────┐
   │  Gnosis Safe(s)     │  treasury, grants, mutual-aid
   │  (Multisig of       │  liquidity-ops, buy-back wallet
   │   Pope-Council)     │
   └──────────┬──────────┘
              │ (4) executes approved actions
              ▼
   on-chain effects: grants paid, LP seeded, NFT ordainments minted, etc.

2.1 Snapshot space

A Snapshot space (e.g. cosg-dao.eth or dobbscoin.eth) is the front door. Holders sign proposals/votes off-chain with their wallet; Snapshot tallies them.

Voting strategies (composable — sum the weights): - erc20-balance-of on wBOB (0x13550ae65f22A36f60A50d625B70b58666488263). - contract-call against the Oku LP position manager so LP’d wBOB still counts. This matters — if you only count balanceOf, anyone seeding the AMM is silently disenfranchised. - (Optional, later) erc20-balance-of on a vBOB time-lock contract that gives voting boost for locked wBOB — Curve-style. Makes long-term holders heavier than flippers. - (Optional, later) bridge-side strategy that mirrors native (BOB) balances by a Merkle drop signed by the bridge oracle. Out of scope for Phase 1 — too easy to get wrong.

2.2 Gnosis Safe (treasury custody)

We need at minimum three Safes, all on Gnosis Chain:

Why split: a compromised Ops Safe can’t drain the long-tail treasury. The Mutual Aid Safe is sized to its job — if the worst happens it loses one tranche, not everything.

Safes hold: native xDAI, wBOB, GNO (gas), maybe BAL/COW LP tokens, and any DAO-issued NFTs (ordainments).

2.3 Zodiac (on-chain execution of off-chain votes)

Snapshot alone is just a poll. Zodiac (a framework of “modules” attached to a Safe) is what makes the poll binding.

Two flavors to evaluate:

• oSnap (Snapshot’s preferred path, by UMA): proposal results post to Snapshot, then anyone can propose execution to the UMA optimistic oracle. There’s a 24–72h challenge window where bonded actors can dispute the proposal as “not what the DAO actually voted.” If unchallenged, Safe executes.
• SafeSnap / Reality Module (older): same idea, uses Reality.eth as oracle.

oSnap is what most active DAOs are migrating to. Recommend that.

The crucial property of both: execution is permissionless — anyone (typically a script/bot) can push the approved tx through after the challenge window. This is good. The Council shouldn’t be the bottleneck on routine execution.

2.4 Why Snapshot+Safe+Zodiac and not on-chain Governor

Phase 1 = Snapshot+Zodiac. Phase 2 (if traction warrants) = layer in an on-chain Governor for high-stakes proposals.

3. Alternative architecture (Phase 2 candidate)

If/when full on-chain governance is justified, the canonical path is:

1. Deploy gwBOB = ERC20VotesWrapper(wBOB) (OpenZeppelin contract, see PACKAGES.md). Users deposit wBOB → mint gwBOB 1:1, withdraw any time.
2. Deploy Governor (OZ Governor + GovernorVotes reading from gwBOB + GovernorTimelockControl).
3. Deploy TimelockController as the actual treasury owner. Council Safe becomes the Guardian (veto-only, not propose).
4. Migrate Safes’ ownership to Timelock.

Trade-off: wrapping is friction. Users must approve + deposit + delegate before they can vote. Most won’t. This is why most DAOs that can run Snapshot+Safe do, and only the ones with strict on-chain custody requirements (Compound, ENS, Uniswap) bother with full Governor.

We will likely never need Phase 2. We should design Phase 1 to make Phase 2 unnecessary.

4. DAO scopes (what the DAO can decide)

Bounded list. New scopes require a charter amendment proposal.

4.1 Treasury operations

• Issue grants (in xDAI, wBOB, or NFT) to contributors / projects.
• Seed and rebalance LP positions (CoW AMM, Oku, future).
• Treasury-funded buy-back-and-burn: Safe market-buys wBOB and sends it to a known burn address. Cosmetically reduces circulating wBOB (NOT native (BOB) supply — be honest about that in copy).
• Diversify treasury (hold xDAI, GNO, etc.).

4.2 Mutual aid / loss reimbursement

• Reimburse users for documented losses (bridge bugs, exchange failures the community caused, etc.).
• Caps and rules in the charter, not voted ad hoc.

4.3 On-chain ordainments

• Mint Minister-of-Slack NFTs (likely ERC-721 with non-transferable / soulbound flag) as recognition.
• Tiers: Acolyte / Reverend / Bishop / Pope. Tiers carry no voting boost (we want voting to track wBOB), but they do gate eligibility for some Council seats.

4.4 Bridge oversight (advisory)

• The DAO does not custody bridge keys in Phase 1. It can:
• Vote on requests-for-comment (recommend pause / recommend upgrade).
• Fund bridge-operator stipends.
• Eventually (Phase 2+) hold a key in a multi-party multisig for the BridgeController. This is a future proposal, not present-day.

4.5 Chain-level signaling

• “We recommend nodes upgrade to v0.10.4.”
• “Pool fee changes.”
• “Devival funding.”
• These are non-binding. The chain doesn’t read DAO state.

4.6 Out of scope (explicit)

• The DAO cannot modify wBOB itself (no token contract upgrade — wBOB has none for a reason).
• The DAO cannot mint wBOB. Only the bridge can. This is critical to repeat.
• The DAO cannot rewrite Dobbscoin consensus. Chain governance is rough-consensus among nodes.

5. Voting parameters (initial proposal)

These should be set by proposal #1 and amendable by supermajority.

Snapshot enforces the first four; Zodiac/oSnap enforces 5–6.

6. Roles

The Pope is mostly ceremonial. Real power = (a) wBOB voters in aggregate, (b) Council multisig for execution.

7. Token strategy

wBOB direct (Phase 1): Snapshot reads balanceOf(wBOB) + LP positions. No deposit. No wrapping.

vBOB lock (optional, Phase 1.5): A separate vBOB contract where users opt-in lock wBOB for N months in exchange for boosted voting weight (Curve veCRV model). Doesn’t break wBOB. Doesn’t require all holders to migrate.

gwBOB wrapper (Phase 2 only): Only if we move to on-chain Governor. Pure 1:1 wrapper. Burnable, withdrawable, no fees.

We should never add a transfer tax or governance hook directly to wBOB.

8. Bootstrap plan

A concrete sequence to go from zero to live:

1. Charter draft — convert this document’s principles + scopes + parameters into a 1–2 page ratifiable charter. Post to the bitcointalk thread + Discord for redlines.
2. Snapshot space — create cosg-dao.eth (or chosen name), configure erc20-balance-of strategy on wBOB. ENS name on mainnet costs ~$5/yr; alternative is unhosted Snapshot space (free, less canonical).
3. Treasury Safes — deploy three Safes on Gnosis. Initial signers = founding Council (you + N trusted SubGenii, named in charter). Fund Treasury Main from existing community pot.
4. Zodiac module — install oSnap (or Reality Module) on Treasury Main Safe, point it at the Snapshot space. Test with a non-binding proposal first.
5. Charter ratification proposal — proposal #0: “Adopt the charter.” Quorum + supermajority. If passes, the charter is binding.
6. Onboarding — Discord bot announces proposals (/dao command in bot). Bridge UI gets a “Vote” tab linking to Snapshot. Explorer footer links the DAO.
7. First real proposal — small, uncontroversial: e.g. “fund Discord-bot hosting for 12 months @ $X.” Builds the ritual.
8. Ordainment NFTs (optional, fun) — proposal #N: “mint 13 Minister-of-Slack NFTs to bootstrap Council.” Symbolic, on-chain, very SubGenius.

9. Threats and mitigations

The honest risk register.

10. What this document is not

• Not a charter. It’s the system design the charter will implement.
• Not implementation. No contract addresses, no Safe deployments, no Snapshot space exists yet.
• Not fixed. Every parameter here is a recommendation; the founding members will redline.

See PACKAGES.md for the libraries and reference DAOs to study before writing the charter.

Praise “Bob”.